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1 Introduction
Unlike most of the chapters in this book, my paper is not concerned with a specific
case. Instead it is methodological. In particular, I discuss the use of simulation
techniques to evaluate unilateral effects of horizontal mergers, bearing in mind the
tradeoff that exists between simple and complex models. On the one hand, a simple
model can be implemented in a short period of time and it can be understood by
non experts. On the other hand, the conclusions concerning merger effects that can
be drawn from a simple model can be very misleading. One is therefore often faced
with the choice between implementability and accuracy. In this chapter, I assess the
implications of that choice.
Due to the tradeoff between simplicity and accuracy, it is unlikely that merger
simulations will ever replace more traditional analysis, such as an examination of the
extent and structure of the market and the merging firms’ shares of that market.
Instead, the two sorts of analysis should be complementary, and, if the limitations
of simulation techniques are understood, they can be useful supplements. It is a
mistake, however, to oversell their potential or their precision.
The use of simulations is illustrated with an application to mergers in the UK
brewing industry, which is an important market that has received much attention from
competition authorities. In particular, there have been a number of mergers that have
changed the structure of the market, as well as proposed but unconsummated mergers
that would have had even more profound effects. Moreover, the positions taken by
UK competition authorities towards brewery mergers have undergone fundamental
changes in recent years.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. I begin with a presentation of the
general method that is used to solve horizontal–merger simulations. That presenta-
tion is followed by more in–depth analyses of the building blocks that underlie the
simulations — demand and costs. Section 4 discusses the UK beer market, the merg-
ers, and public policy towards those mergers, whereas section 5 presents the data,
which is a panel of brands of beer. Section 6 looks at implementation. In particu-
lar, the sensitivity of predicted prices, costs, margins, and merger effects to modeling
choices is assessed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a more optimistic discussion of
how quantitative techniques can be used to organize our thoughts concerning mergers,
even if they are unreliable methods of obtaining point estimates of merger effects.
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2 Simulation of Unilateral Effects
In North America, merger policy tends to be based on the notion of unilateral effects.2
In other words, authorities usually attempt to determine if firms in an industry have
market power and how a merger will affect that power, assuming that the firms act
in an uncoordinated fashion. In practice, this change is often evaluated as a move
from one static Nash equilibrium to a second equilibrium with fewer players.3
European authorities, in contrast, tend to base their policy on the notion of dom-
inance. In other words, they seek to determine if a single firm or group of firms
occupies a dominant position and if the merger will strengthen that position. Tradi-
tionally, single–firm dominance was emphasized. However, the notion of joint dom-
inance has assumed increasing importance due to high–profile merger cases such as
Nestle/Perrier, Gencor/Lonrho, and Airtours. Joint dominance is usually taken to
mean tacit collusion or coordinated effects.4
In this chapter, I assess quantitative techniques that are based on the notion of
unilateral effects and can be used to evaluate horizontal mergers. In particular, I con-
sider mergers in a market for a differentiated product with many brands. Under those
circumstances, it is difficult for firms to collude tacitly and uncoordinated decision
making seems more plausible.5
The goal of a merger simulation is to predict the equilibrium prices that will be
charged and the quantities of each brand that will be sold under the new, post–merger
market structure, using only information that is available pre merger. The advantage
of such an approach is that, if the simulation can forecast accurately, it is much more
efficient to perform an ex ante evaluation than to wait for an ex post assessment. In
particular, the likelihood of costly divestitures is lessened when merger effects can be
forecast.
An understanding of the method that is used to solve horizontal–merger simula-
tions is facilitated by an example. Consider the case of K firms that produce n brands
of a differentiated product with K ≤ n. The brands are assumed to be substitutes,
but the strength of substitutability can vary by brand pair. It is standard to assume
that the firms are engaged in a static pricing game. A market structure in that game
2 US antitrust authorities, however, often use the the notion of coordinated effects to analyze
mergers in industries that produce homogenous products (see, e.g., Sibley and Heyer 2003).
3 See, e.g., Werden and Froeb (1994), Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), Nevo (2000), Ja-
yaratne and Shapiro (2000), Pinkse and Slade (2004), and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005).
4 See, e.g., Lexicon (1999), Kuhn (2000), Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002), and Kuhn (2005).
5 Nevo (2000) and Slade(2004a) test and fail to reject the Bertrand assumption for breakfast
cereals and beer respectively.
2
consists of a partition of the brand space into K subsets, where each subset is con-
trolled by one firm or decision maker. Specifically, each firm can choose the prices of
the brands that are in its subset. A merger then involves combining two or more of
the subsets and allowing one player to choose the prices that were formerly chosen
by two or more players.
Consider a typical player’s choice. When the price of brand i increases, the de-
mand for brand j shifts out. If both brands are owned by the same firm, that firm
will capture the pricing externality. If they are owned by different firms, in contrast,
the externality will be ignored. After a merger involving substitutes, therefore, prices
should increase, or at least not fall. The question that horizontal–merger simula-
tions aim to answer is by how much. Clearly the answer depends on the matrix of
cross–price elasticities. Merger simulations have therefore focused on modeling and
estimating demand. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to have estimates of costs,
ideally marginal costs. A demand equation and a cost function are thus the basic
building blocks upon which a merger simulation is based.
3 The Building Blocks
There are many ways to obtain estimates of demand and costs and, in what follows,
I discuss some of them. When choosing a specification, one must keep in mind the
important tradeoff that must be made between simplicity and accuracy. In particular,
time is of the essence, since the competition authority has only a limited period in
which to decide if a merger will be challenged. This means that simple models are
preferred. If a model is constructed too hastily, however, it is apt to be simplistic,
and conclusions that are based on it are apt to be misleading. I therefore discuss
specifications that range from extremely inflexible to moderately flexible.
3.1 Demand
Firms can possess market power because they have few competitors and thus operate
in concentrated markets. Even when there are many producers of similar items, how-
ever, they can possess market power if their products have unique features that cause
rival products to be poor substitutes. To evaluate power in markets where products
are differentiated, it is therefore important to have good estimates of substitutability.
A number of demand specifications have been developed to deal with differentiated
products. In this paper, I look at three functional forms — the logit, the nested
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logit, and the distance metric — that range from extremely simple to more flexible.
With all three, there are n brands of a differentiated product with output vector
q = (q1, . . . , qn)
T , as well as an outside good q0 that is an aggregate of other products.
Furthermore, I assume that there is only one market with exogenous size M .6
The Logit
There are many specifications of demand that are based on a random-utility model
in which an individual consumes one unit of the brand that yields the highest utility.
The logit, which is the simplest of those specifications, results in the demand equation
ln(si)− ln(s0) = βTxi − αpi + ξi, (1)
where si = qi/M is brand i’s market share, s0 is the share of the outside good, xi is
a vector of observed characteristics of brand i, pi is that brand’s price, and ξi is an
unobserved (by the econometrician) characteristic.
The popularity of this equation is due to its simplicity and the fact that it can
be easily estimated by instrumental–variables techniques. Its drawback is that it
is highly restrictive. To illustrate, let εij denote the price-elasticity of demand,
(∂qi/∂pj)(pj/qi). With the logit-demand equation, those elasticities take the form
εii = αpi(si − 1) and εij = αpjsj, j 6= i. (2)
Clearly, the substitution patterns that are implied by (2) are unappealing. For
example, all elasticities increase linearly with price and with market share,7 and all
off-diagonal elements in a column of the elasticity matrix are equal. Furthermore,
since si is i’s share of the total market, which includes the outside good, estimated
elasticities are very sensitive to the choice of the outside good. In particular, by defin-
ing the market, M , more generously, one can cause own price elasticities to rise in
magnitude and predicted markups to fall (see appendix A). In this sense, simulations
based on logit demand equations have much in common with more traditional anal-
yses, which involve defining the market and calculating concentration indices based
on firms’ shares of that market.
6 The single–market assumption can easily be relaxed, and it almost always is in practice.
7 A second very simple demand model that has been used for merger simulations, the PCAIDS,
also relies on the proportionally assumption and thus has similar problems. Specifically, it assumes
that, when the price of one brand rises, the probability that a customer who stops purchasing that
brand will switch to a particular substitute is proportional to the substitute’s market share (see
Epstein and Rubinfeld 2002).
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The Nested Logit
The nested–logit (NL) is distinguished from the ordinary logit by the fact that the
n brands or products are partitioned into G groups, indexed by g = 1, ..., G, and the
outside good is placed in group 0. The partition is chosen so that like products are
in the same group. For example, when the differentiated product is beer, the groups
might be lager, ale, and stout.
The NL estimating equation is
ln(si)− ln(s0) = βTxi − αpi + σln(s¯i/g) + ξi, (3)
where s¯i/g is brand i’s share of the group g to which it belongs.
8 The parameter σ
(0 ≤ σ ≤ 1) measures the within-group correlation of tastes, and the ordinary logit
is obtained by setting σ equal to zero.
With the NL–demand equation, the own and cross–price elasticities take the form
εii = αpi[si − 1/(1− σ) + σ/(1− σ)s¯i/g], (4)
εij =
 αpj[sj + σ/(1− σ)s¯j/g], j 6= i, j ∈ gαpjsj, j 6= i, j 6∈ g.
The substitution patterns that are implied by (4) are only slightly more general than
those implied by the logit. In particular, the off–diagonal elements in a column of the
elasticity matrix take on at most two values, depending on whether the rival product
is in the same or a different group.
Extensions to the Nested Logit
There are at least two ways in which the nested logit can be extended. First,
the price coefficient, α, can be a function of product characteristics, αi = α(xi).
9
When the product is beer, for example, the characteristics might be the brand’s
alcohol content, product type (e.g., lager, ale, or stout), and brewer identity, and the
modification allows elasticities to vary with those characteristics.
Second, the within–group correlation of tastes can vary by group, σg, g = 1, . . . , G.
10
This modification allows cross–price elasticities to be systematically larger in some
groups than in others. For example, stout drinkers might be less willing to switch
than lager drinkers.
8 See McFadden (1974).
9 This extension is used in Slade (2004a).
10 This extension is used in Brenkers and Verboven (2006) and Slade (2004a).
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The Distance Metric
Brands of a differentiated product can compete along many dimensions in product–
characterisitc space. For empirical tractability, however, one must limit attention to
a small subset of those dimensions. Nevertheless, it is not desirable to exclude pos-
sibilities a priori. The distance–metric (DM) demand model, which is based on a
normalized–quadratic utility function, is somewhat more flexible than the NL. In
particular, it allows the researcher to experiment with and determine the strength of
competition along many dimensions.11 Indeed, virtually any hypothesis concerning
the way in which products compete (any distance measure) can be assessed in the
DM framework. However, only the most important measures are typically used in
the final specification.
A feature that distinguishes the DM from the NL is that, with the former, cross–
price elasticities depend on attributes of both brands — i and j — whereas with
the latter, they depend only on the characteristics of j. To achieve this dependence,
however, one must interact prices with distance in characteristic or geographic space.
Unfortunately, with a large number of brands it is clearly impractical to include all
rival prices on the right–hand side of the estimating equation and even less practical
to interact those prices with own and rival characteristics. In what follows, I describe
how one can formulate a tractable model that condenses this information.
With the DM specification, demands for the differentiated product are12
qi = ai + Σjbijpj − γiy + ξi, (5)
where y is aggregate income. Although the functional form is very simple, equation
(5) is empirically intractable for most applications, since the matrix B = [bij] has
n(n+ 1)/2 parameters.
To simplify, assume that ai and bii, i = 1, . . . n, are functions of the character-
istics of brand i, ai = a(xi) and bii = b(xi). This assumption is similar to one of
the extensions to the nested logit. In addition, the off–diagonal elements of B, are
assumed to be functions of a vector of measures of the distance, dij, between brands
in some set of metrics, bij = g(dij). For example, when the product is beer, the
measures of distance, or its inverse closeness, might be alcoholic-content proximity
and dummy variables that indicate whether the brands belong to the same prod-
uct type (e.g., whether both are stouts) and whether they are brewed by the same
11 See Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (1998) and Pinkse and Slade (2004).
12 Equation (5) should be divided by a price index, p0(γ0 + γT p). However, that index can be set
equal to one in a cross section or very short time series.
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firm. The function g(·) can be estimated by parametric or semiparametric methods.
Finally, the random variable ξ, which captures the influence of unobserved product
characteristics, can be heteroskedastic and spatially correlated.
The own and cross-price elasticities that are implied by equation (5) are
εii =
pia(xi)
qi
and εij =
pjg(dij)
qi
. (6)
As with the nested logit, DM elasticities depend on prices and market shares. How-
ever, they can be modeled very flexibly. In particular, by choosing appropriate dis-
tance measures, one can obtain models in which substitution patterns depend on a
priori product groupings, as with the NL. There are, however, many other possibili-
ties. For example, one can also obtain models in which cross-price elasticities depend
on continuous distance measures, such as differences in alcohol contents.
Discussion
In the application I assess whether the functional form chosen for the demand
equation is an important determinant of predicted prices and markups. Due to the
need to restrict attention to simple models, a simple parametric version of the DM
equation with two distance measures is used.
The four demand equations are estimated from the same panel data set. Those
equations could also be calibrated, where by calibration I mean finding an exact solu-
tion for their parameters. To illustrate, consider the logit demand equation (1) with
two product characteristics, x1 and x2. There are four parameters in that equation,
β0, β1, β2, and α. Calibration requires only as many observations as parameters; one
simply solves the system of four equations for the four unknown parameters. Es-
timation, in contrast, is a statistical process that requires more observations than
parameters. In what follows, I do not consider calibration. However, we know a
priori that, although it is simpler, calibration is less accurate than estimation.
3.2 Marginal Costs
A demand equation is one of the building blocks that is used to assess merger effects.
In addition, one must have estimates of marginal costs, ci, i = 1, . . . , n. There are at
least three methods that can be used to obtain those estimates.
Exogenous Costs
With the first method, researchers obtain independent information (e.g., engi-
neering or accounting data) on unit costs. This information is then substituted into
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the first-order conditions that are solved to obtain equilibrium prices and markups.
The advantage of this method is its simplicity. The disadvantage is that, unless the
cost data are very accurate, it is difficult to distinguish between average–variable and
marginal costs. Exogenous estimates of marginal costs are denoted cˇi, i = 1, . . . , n.
Implicit Costs
With the second method, which involves estimating marginal costs implicitly, re-
searchers assume that firms are engaged in a particular game (e.g., Bertrand) and
write down the first-order conditions for that game. Those conditions typically in-
clude marginal costs as well as demand parameters. One can therefore substitute the
estimated demand parameters into the first-order conditions and solve those condi-
tions for implicit costs. In other words, implicit costs are the estimates that rationalize
the observed prices and the equilibrium assumption.
To illustrate, consider a simple pricing game where each firm produces one brand
and sets its price so that (pi − ci)/pi = −1/εii. There are n first-order conditions
of this form that can be solved for the n unknowns, ci. With the example, given
estimates of demand elasticities and observed prices, an implicit estimate of marginal
cost is pi(1+ 1/εˆii). This method is valid if the firms are indeed playing the assumed
game. If they are playing a different game, however, the estimates of marginal costs
so obtained are biased. The implicit estimates are denoted c˜i, i = 1, . . . , n.
Estimated Costs
The third method involves estimating marginal costs econometrically from first-
order conditions. In particular, one can replace ci with a function of standard cost
variables such as factor prices, v, and product attributes, xi, ci = c(v, xi), and esti-
mate that function. To illustrate, with the example above, one could estimate the
equation pi = c(v, xi)[
ii
1+ii
]. This procedure is subject to the criticisms of method
2. Furthermore, since demand and cost are estimated jointly, if the equilibrium as-
sumption is incorrect, the misspecificaton contaminates the estimates of demand. A
two–step procedure, with demand estimated in stage one and first–order conditions
in stage two, is therefore recommended. Econometric estimates of marginal costs are
denoted cˆi, i = 1, . . . , n.
In the application, I also assess whether the method that is chosen to estimate
marginal costs is an important determinant of predicted prices and markups.
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3.3 The Game
When products are differentiated, it is common to assume that the firms in the
market are engaged in a static pricing game. This is, however, by no means the
only reasonable assumption. For example, it is possible that firms choose some other
variable, such as quantity, or a vector of variables, such as price and quality. In
addition, if the firms collude tacitly or overtly, prices and markups will be higher than
those predicted by Bertrand competition.13 If, in contrast, competition is destructive
or cutthroat, they will be lower. Indeed, the famous folk theorem of repeated games
tells us that, if players are sufficiently patient, any outcome between competitive and
joint–profit maximizing can be supported as a subgame–perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game.
Bertrand competition is an obvious focal point for the estimation of unilateral
effects in markets where products are differentiated. However, it is also interesting
to obtain bounds on possible outcomes, which can be done by examining predicted
competitive and perfectly collusive prices and margins. The general method of solu-
tion is the same as that discussed in section 2. Indeed, given any equilibrium solution
concept, one can obtain n first–order conditions that can be solved for the prices that
correspond to that concept.14 Bounds on prices and markups can be used to assess
whether simulation predictions are sensitive to assumptions concerning the game that
players are engaged in.
4 The UK Beer Market
4.1 International Comparisons
Although beer markets have certain features in common across countries, cross–
country differences are also striking. It is therefore useful to begin with a few in-
ternational comparisons. Table 1 summarizes some of the differences between the
UK, US, Canada, France, and Germany. This table shows that, when it comes to
beer consumption per head and the fraction of beer sales that originate abroad, the
UK lies between France and Germany, with Germany having higher per capita con-
sumption and France relying more heavily on imports. Consumers in the US and
Canada, who are similar to each other, drink less beer per capita and tend to con-
13 In this case, one is no longer considering unilateral effects.
14 If firms choose j variables, there will be j × n first–order conditions.
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sume fewer imports than their counterparts in the UK. Finally, over time, per capita
beer consumption has fallen in most countries, whereas imports have risen.
Whereas the UK is not an outlier with respect to the statistics contained in the
first two parts of table 1, it is clearly different from the other countries with respect
to the ratio of draft to total beer sales, as can be seen in the last part. Indeed,
draft sales in the UK accounted for almost three times the comparable percentages
in France and Germany and about six times the percentages in North America. In
all countries, however, draft’s fraction has fallen, as more beer has been consumed at
home.
Turning to production, table 2 compares one important aspect of the industry
— its concentration, or lack thereof, into the hands of a small number of brewers.
The table shows concentration ratios that were calculated in 1985, before the UK
mergers that are discussed below occurred.15 The UK industry was clearly less
concentrated than its counterparts in the US, Canada, and France, where beer tends
to be mass produced. Production in Germany, in contrast, where specialty beers
predominate, was much less concentrated. It thus seems that brand heterogeneity
and an unconcentrated brewing sector go hand in hand.
4.2 The UK Industry
The UK beer industry has undergone substantial changes in both production and
consumption in the last few decades, some of which are summarized in table 3. Beers
can be divided into three broad categories: ales, stouts, and lagers. Although UK
consumers have traditionally preferred ales to lagers, the consumption of lager has
increased at a steady pace. Indeed, from less than 1% of the market in 1960, lager
became the most popular drink in 1990, with sales exceeding the sum of ale and stout,
and its popularity continues to grow. Most UK lagers bear the names of familiar non–
British beers such as Budweiser, Fosters, and Kronenbourg. Almost all, however, are
brewed under license in the UK and are therefore not considered to be imports.
A second important aspect of beer consumption is the popularity of ‘real’ or cask–
conditioned ale. Real products are alive and undergo a second fermentation in the
cask, whereas keg and tank products are sterilized. The statistics that are shown
in table 3, however, which show that real ale’s market share has remained relatively
constant, must be interpreted with caution, since they show percentages of the ale
15 With the exception of Germany, the table shows three–firm concentration ratios. Any other
concentration measure, however, would tell the same story.
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market. As a percentage of the total beer market, which includes lager, real products
have lost ground.
The final trend in consumption is the decline in on–premise sales. On–premise
consumption includes sales in bars, hotels, and clubs, whereas off–premise consump-
tion refers to beer that is purchased in a store and consumed at home, out of doors,
or in nonlicensed establishments. Clearly, draft sales are a subset of on–premise
consumption, since some packaged products are consumed in licensed establishments.
With respect to production, table 3 shows that the number of brewers has declined
steadily. Indeed, in 1900, there were nearly 1,500 brewery companies, but this number
fell during the century and is currently below sixty. In addition to incorporated
brewers, however, there are many microbreweries operating at very small scales. In
fact, most brewers are small, and few produce products that account for more then
1/2% of local markets.
This snapshot of the UK beer industry shows significant changes in tastes and
consumption habits as well as a decline in the number of companies that cater to
those tastes. Nevertheless, as we have seen, compared to many other countries, the
UK brewing sector was only moderately concentrated. Recent developments in the
industry, however, have resulted in substantial changes in ownership patterns.
4.3 Public Policy Towards the UK Beer Industry
It is not unusual for the beer industry to attract the attention of politicians and civil
servants. Government involvement in the industry stems from four concerns: the
social consequences of alcohol consumption, the revenue obtained from alcohol sales,
the level of concentration in the brewing sector, and the extent of brewer control over
retailing. In recent years, moreover, public scrutiny of the industry has accelerated.
Indeed, there have been over thirty reviews by UK and European Union authorities
since the 1960s. Many of those investigations were triggered by proposed mergers in
the industry. Several, however, were more general assessments of prices, profits, and
tied sales.16
Figure 1 shows actual and proposed changes in the structure of the UK beer mar-
ket. In particular, there were three successful mergers; between Courage and Grand
Metropolitan (Grand Met) in 1990, Allied Lyons and Carlsberg in 1992, and Courage
and Scottish & Newcastle (S&N) in 1995. In addition, there were two proposed merg-
ers that were unsuccessful; one in 1997 between Bass and Carlsberg–Tetley (CT) was
16 For an analysis of tied sales in the UK brewing sector, see Slade (1998).
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denied, and the second in 2000 between Bass and Whitbread eventually resulted in
divestiture of Bass’s brewing assets.
Each of the mergers is discussed below. However, it is difficult to understand the
positions taken by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) and Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) with respect to the horizontal mergers without considering their
views on the vertical links between brewers and their retail outlets. Vertical issues
are therefore discussed first.
4.3.1 The Beer Orders
Prior to the late 1980s, a large fraction of UK public houses (pubs) were owned
by brewers and operated under exclusive–purchasing agreements (ties) that limited
the pubs to selling brands that were produced by their affiliated brewer.17 Public
officials have long been concerned that those tying arrangements would somehow
extend the market power that they perceived in the upstream or brewing sector to
the downstream or retailing sector. Absent the system of ties, they believed that
retailing would be competitive.
In the late 1980’s, the OFT requested the MMC to undertake a major industry
review. The product of that investigation was the 500–page MMC report entitled
“The Supply of Beer,” which appeared in February of 1989. The MMC recommended
measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14,000 public houses.
The Commission claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and
increase consumer choice. There has been considerable doubt, however, that their
objectives were achieved. Indeed, after divestiture, retail beer prices rose (Slade
1998).
The MMC report is unclear about the economic reasoning that led to the decision
to force divestiture.18 Nevertheless, the MMC alleged that, due to high concentra-
tion, the brewers possessed market power and their involvment in retailing protected
that power.
The Beer Orders were rescinded in 2002.
17 Such tying arrangements are illegal in the US. See Slade (2000) for a discussion of the legal
differences.
18 See Lafontaine and Slade (2006) for a summary of theories of anticompetitive foreclosure,
exclusion, and extension of horizontal market power through vertical integration, as well as the
empirical evidence on the subject. They find that the evidence of anticompetitive effects is weak.
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4.3.2 The Mergers
After the Beer Orders, the brewing industry became more concentrated. Increases
in brewing–market concentration were due to mergers, which the MMC allowed, as
well as to the fact that some firms (e.g. Boddingtons) ceased brewing, whereas others
(e.g. Courage) ceased retailing. Nevertheless, as we illustrate below, for some time
the MMC favored recommendations that focused on the retail sector and the vertical
linkages between brewers and public houses in spite of their claim that the source of
monopoly power lay in brewing.
The Courage/Grand Met Merger: The merger between Courage and Grand Met
that occurred in 1990, just after the Beer Orders were passed, reduced the number of
national brewers from six to five. At the time of the merger, Grand Met controlled
11% of the beer market, whereas Courage controlled 9%. The merger transformed
Courage into the second largest producer, just behind Bass, which had a market
share of 22%. Nevertheless, three of the four MMC recommendations involved the
tied estate rather than increases in brewing concentration per se.
The Allied Lyons/Carlsberg Joint Venture: In 1992, Allied Lyons, a British food
company that owned breweries, formed a joint venture with Carlsberg, a Danish
brewer. Their combined UK brewing assets were renamed Carlsberg–Tetley. At the
time of the joint venture, Allied Lyons controlled 12% of the beer market, whereas
Carlsberg controlled 4%. Their shares of the lager market, however, were higher, with
8 and 13%, respectively. The joint venture became the third largest brewer, behind
Bass and Courage. The number of national brewers, however, was unchanged, since
Carlsberg was not one of them. The MMC was principally concerned with the fact
that Carlsberg was one of a very few brewers without a tied estate.19
The Courage S&N Merger: In 1995, the merged firm Courage merged again with
Scottish & Newcastle. This event, which reduced the number of national brewers from
five to four, created the largest brewer in the UK. The combined firm, with a market
share of 28%, was substantially larger than Bass, which had a market share of 23%
and thus dropped from number one to two. In spite of the fact that the majority of the
groups that were asked to comment on the merger favored a full investigation by the
MMC, the OFT did not refer the matter to the MMC. Instead, it allowed the merger
19 Brewers without tied estates are not vertically integrated into retailing and have no exclusive–
purchasing agreements.
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to proceed subject to a number of undertakings, all of which involved the tied estate.
The OFT rejected the idea of divestiture of breweries or brands but instead favored
“the alternative remedy that has generally been adopted following previous references
... to weaken the extent of vertical links with the merged company.” (DGFT, 1995).
The Bass/CT Merger: The fourth and largest merger was proposed in 1997 but not
consummated. This involved the numbers two and three brewers, Bass and Carlsberg–
Tetley, and would have created a new firm, BCT, with an overall market share of 37%.
Moreover, it would have further reduced the number of national brewers from four to
three. At the time, Bass controlled 23% of the beer market, CT controlled 14%, and
Scottish Courage, which would have become the second largest firm, had a market
share of 28%. The MMC estimated that, after the merger, the Hirshman/Herfindahl
index of concentration (HHI) would rise from 1,678 to 2,332. Furthermore, it noted
that the US Department of Justice’s 1992 Merger Guidelines specify that a merger
should raise concerns about competition if the post–merger HHI is over 1,800 and the
change in the HHI is at least 50 points. Nevertheless, the MMC recommended that the
merger be allowed to go forward.20 In spite of the MMC’s favorable recommendation,
the merger was not consummated because the president of the Board of Trade did
not accept the MMC’s advice.
The Bass/Whitbread Merger: More recently, in May of 2000, the world’s largest
brewer, the Belgian firm Interbrew, acquired Whitbread, the UK’s fourth national
brewer. That acquisition did not change the number of brewers in the UK, but it
transferred the ownership of some brands. More importantly, in August of the same
year, Interbrew also acquired Bass, which gave it a UK market share of approximately
36%. This time the MMC did not approve the merger. Instead, it recommended that
Interbrew be required to divest the UK brewing assets of Bass to a buyer approved
by the Director General of Fair Trading. Interbrew appealed the MMC decision to
the High Court, however, and won on a legal technicality.21 Nevertheless, although
Intebrew kept the Bass brand name, the majority of Bass Brewing’s assets were sold
to Coors in 2002.
The MMC’s attitude towards earlier mergers in the brewing industry is puzzling.
It seems that either they concluded that brewers had little market power or that
20 The one economist on the Commission, David Newbery, wrote a dissenting opinion.
21 Specifically, it was decided that Interbrew had not been allowed sufficient time to consider
alternative remedies.
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large increases in concentration would not change that power. However, their own
calculations estimated that brewing margins were approximately 30%, which is mod-
erately high. For example, margins of approximately 20% are more common in the
food sector.
The MMC’s views, however, changed over the decade of the 90s. In particular,
early on the Commission was almost exclusively concerned with vertical relation-
ships in the industry, whereas, by the end of the decade, a concern with horizontal
concentration assumed prominence.
Was increased concern with horizontal–market power justified? As a first cut to
answering that question one can examine the market shares of the firms before and
after each merger. Those shares are shown in table 4, which reveals that, with all
three consummated mergers, a few years afterwards the merged firm’s market share
was less than the sum of the premerger shares. This suggests that increased efficiency
did not overwhelm increased market power. However, although one might arrive at
this conclusion with hindsight, it is more relevant to see if one could have reached the
same conclusion ex ante.
5 The Data
5.1 Demand Data
The data are a panel of brands of draft beer sold in different markets, where a market
is a time–period/geographic–region pair. The panel also includes two types of estab-
lishments, multiples and independents. Brands that are sold in different markets are
assumed not to compete, whereas brands that are sold in the same market but in
different types of establishments are allowed to compete. A complete description of
the data, which is summarized here, can be found in the appendix B.
For each observation, there is a price, PRICE, sales volume, VOL, and coverage,
COV, where coverage is the percentage of outlets that stocked the brand. Each brand
has an alcohol content, ALC. Moreover, brands whose alcohol contents are greater
than 4.2% are called premium, whereas those with lower alcohol contents are called
regular beers. This distinction is captured by a dummy variable, PREM. Finally,
brands are classified into four product types, lagers, stouts, keg ales, and real ales
using dichotomous variables, PRODi, i = 1, . . . , 4. Those types form the basis of the
groups for the nested logit.
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A number of interaction variables are also used. Interactions with price are de-
noted PRVVV, where VVV is a characteristic. To illustrate, PRALCi denotes price
times alcohol content, PRICEi × ALCi.
5.2 The Metrics
Using the same data, Pinkse and Slade (2004) experimented with a number of metrics
or measures of similarity of beer brands. These include several discrete measures:
same product type, same brewer, and various measures of being nearest neighbors or
sharing a market boundary in product–characteristic space. Two continuous measures
of closeness, one in alcohol–content and the other in coverage space, were also used.
They found that one metric stands out in the sense that it has the greatest
explanatory power, both by itself and in equations that include several measures.
That metric, WPROD, is the same–product–type measure that is set equal to one if
both brands are, for example real ales, and zero otherwise, and then normalized so
that the entries in a row sum to one. A second measure, a similar–alcohol–content
measure, is also included in their final specification. That metric is calculated as
WALCij = 1/(1 + 2 | ALCi − ALCj |). I use the same metrics here.
To create average rival prices, the vector, PRICE, is premultiplied by each dis-
tance matrix, W , and the product is denoted RPW. For example, RPPROD is
WPROD×PRICE, which has as ith element the average of the prices of the other
brands that are of the same product type as i.
5.3 Cost Data
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission performed a detailed study of brewing and
wholesaling costs by brand and company. In addition, they assessed retailing costs
in managed public houses.22 A summary of the results of that study is published
in MMC (1989). Although the assessment of costs was conducted on a brand and
company basis, only aggregate costs by product type are publicly available. Those
data, which are discussed in appendix B, are used for the exogenous costs, cˇ.
22 Managed public houses are owned and operated by a brewer.
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6 Results
6.1 Demand
The four demand equations are summarized in table 5. Consider first the logit and its
variants. With all three specifications, the market is sales of beer. The outside good
is therefore on and off–premise sales of beer in bottles and cans. The table shows
that the price coefficient, −α, increases in magnitude and significance as one moves
from the logit to the nested logit to the extension of the nested logit,23 which is an
indication that the estimated elasticities will be progressively larger. Furthermore,
the parameter σ is large (recall that it is bounded by one) and highly significant,
which indicates that the nested logit or its extension is preferred. Finally, when σ
is allowed to vary by product type, there is substantial variation in the estimates of
that parameter.
Now consider the distance–metric demand estimates. Due to differences in de-
pendent variables and functional forms, one cannot compare magnitudes of price
coefficients directly. However, the price coefficients are clearly more significant than
with the logit variants.24 The estimates show that demand is more elastic for pop-
ular national brands with high coverage and for brands that have many neighbors in
product–characteristic space.25
The estimated average own and cross–price elasticities that are shown in table 6
are easier to interpret, since they are comparable across demand specifications. That
table shows that, using the logit, one would conclude that demand at the brand level
is inelastic, which is clearly unrealistic. As one moves from logit to nested logit to
extended NL to distance metric, however, average own–price elasticities increase in
magnitude. Nevertheless, all estimates are lower than the elasticities that were found
by Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (HLZ, 1995) for US brands. However, since US
brands are more homogenous, they could be more substitutable, and there is no a
priori reason to expect that UK–brand elasticities will be as large as those found for
the US.
The estimated cross–price elasticities display similar patterns — increasing as one
goes down the table, and all are substantially below the HLZ cross–price estimates.
23 Only one extension of the nested logit is shown — variation in σ by product type. When α was
modeled as a function of product characteristics, there was little change in estimated elasticities.
24 Recall that the price coefficients begin with PR.
25 COVR is the reciprocal of coverage and NCB measures the number of common–boundary
neighbors in alcohol/coverage space (see appendix B.)
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However, HLZ consider fewer brands which, all else equal, will result in higher cross–
price elasticities.
Inelastic demand at the brand level, as implied by the logit, leads to an unrealistic
model. In particular, markups over cost will be negative on average. For this reason,
the logit is not discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
6.2 Costs
Table 7 shows exogenous costs, cˇ, implicit costs, c˜, that were obtained under three
demand specifications, and estimated costs, cˆ, that were obtained by estimating a
marginal–cost function jointly with the distance–metric demand equation.
The exogenous costs show very little variation, which is due to the aggregate
nature of the cost data that was released by the MMC. As noted earlier, those numbers
are average variable costs and only equal marginal costs if marginal costs are constant.
The implicit costs were obtained from first–order conditions for a static pricing
game (Bertrand) under three demand specifications. The table shows that those
estimates increase as one moves from nested logit to extended NL to distance metric,
which must be true. Indeed, when the estimated elasticities increase in magnitude,
the implied markups fall. Holding prices constant, this can only happen if costs rise.
On average, implicit distance–metric costs are closest to exogenous costs. However,
there is substantially greater variation in the implicit–cost estimates.
Table 8 assesses the sensitivity of implicit costs to the assumption that is made
concerning equilibrium behavior. That table shows estimates that correspond to
marginal–cost pricing, a static pricing game, and joint–profit–maximizing behavior.
The two extremes bound the possibilities that one might expect to observe. The
table shows that implicit costs fall as one moves from competitive to imperfectly
competitive to monopoly pricing. This pattern is also expected. Indeed, since prices
are the same in all three scenarios, the only way for markups to increase is for costs
to fall. Most of the variation across specifications, however, comes from variation at
the low end. The maximum implicit cost is relatively constant.
It is important to notice that the numbers in table 8 bound the possible cost
estimates only under the distance–metric specification. Indeed, table 7 shows that
the implicit costs obtained from solving a static pricing game using the nested–logit
demand specifications are lower on average than the lowest possible estimates using
the distance–metric specification (79.0 and 98.6 versus 99.1). Cost estimates are thus
very sensitive to both demand and equilibrium assumptions.
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Finally, econometrically estimated costs were obtained using a two–step GMM
procedure (demand estimated first and first–order conditions second) with a marginal–
cost function that depends on volume, qi, as well as product characteristics, xi.
26 The
estimated cost functions, which are shown in table 9, indicate that marginal costs rise
with output (VOL). In addition, marginal costs are higher for premium (high alcohol)
beers and in managed public houses. Finally, it is more costly to produce lagers and
stouts than ales.
Mean estimated costs are shown in the last row of table 7.27 On average, they
are somewhat higher but not far from exogenous costs and more variable than both
exogenous and implicit costs.
6.3 Predicted Prices and Margins
Table 10 shows predicted prices and margins under the three demand specifications.
Those numbers were obtained by solving the first–order conditions for a static pricing
game using the indicated demand function and the exogenous cost estimates, cˇ. This
exercise is in some sense the opposite of the one that was performed to obtain the
implicit costs shown in table 7. In that table, prices are held constant and the
cost estimates are those that rationalize the observed prices, given the estimated
elasticities. In table 10, costs are held constant and the predicted prices are those
that rationalize the observed costs, given the estimated elasticities. It is therefore not
surprising that, whereas implicit costs rise as one moves down table 7, predicted prices
and margins fall as one moves down table 10. As in earlier tables, the prices that
are obtained using the distance–metric demand equation are closest to the observed
prices.
6.4 Merger Simulations
The final exercise involves using the three demand equations with the exogenous costs
to simulate changes in industry market structure. All simulations are performed using
the procedure that is described in section 2. In particular, suppose that there are K
firms or decision makers in the industry before an event and K − J firms afterwards.
If J > 0, the event is a merger, whereas if J < 0, it is a divestiture. In other words,
a merger (divestiture) results in fewer (more) decision makers.
26 A two–step procedure was chosen so that any misspecification in the nature of equilibrium
would not contaminate the demand equation.
27 The numbers shown in the table were evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables.
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The data were collected in 1995, after the Scottish/Courage (SC) merger occurred
and before the Bass/Carlsberg–Tetley (BCT) merger was proposed. The status quo
is thus an industry with four national brewers and a number of smaller firms. Two
events are considered. The first, which is a divestiture, involves undoing the Scot-
tish/Courage merger. It is thus a move from four to five national brewers. The
second, which is a merger, involves allowing Bass and Carlsberg–Tetley to combine.
It is thus a move from four to three national brewers.
Table 11 summarizes the results of those exercises. The first set of numbers
(marked Status Quo in the table), which merely duplicates the information that is
contained in table 10, is included for comparison purposes. The second and third
portions of the table summarize the results of simulations of the two events. For each
simulation, the table shows mean predicted prices and percentage changes from the
status quo. Predicted post–event prices are always compared to predicted status quo
prices rather than to observed prices, since that comparison gives each demand model
the benefit of the doubt. In particular, since the NL models over predict prices in
the status quo, comparisons with observed prices would predict unreasonably large
changes (in absolute value) for most specifications.
First consider differences in predictions across events. With the simple logit,
brand–level demand was estimated to be inelastic on average. For that reason, the
table does not show logit simulations. However, we know a priori that the logit model
would predict price changes that are not very different in magnitude across mergers.
This is true because the sums of the pre–merger market shares of the merging firms, as
well as the changes in the HHI, would have been roughly equal for the two events.28
The simulations that are shown in table 11, in contrast, predict smaller changes
for the Scottish/Courage merger than for BCT. This is partly due to the fact that the
similarity of the merging firms’ brands was less for SC. In particular, whereas Courage
had two best–selling lagers, Fosters and Kronenbourg, S&N had little presence in the
lager market. In contrast, both Bass and Carlsberg–Tetley had best–selling lagers,
Carling and Carlsberg, respectively. Unlike the logit, the other specifications are
capable of capturing these differences in brand fit across mergers.
Now consider differences in predictions across specifications, which are substantial.
In particular, predicted price changes are greatest for the nested logit, second for the
extended NL, and smallest for the distance metric. This pattern is due to the fact
that the estimated cross–price elasticities increase as one moves from the first demand
28 Although the sum of the per–merger national–market shares was 30% for SC and 37% for BCT,
the SC sum was 37% of the markets in the data.
20
model to the third. In other words, the brands become more substitutable.
Finally, the price changes that are predicted by both NL models seem unrealis-
tically large, especially when one notes that, although each event involves only two
firms, the averages that are shown in the table reflect the prices of all brands in the
market. Clearly, changes in the prices of the affected brands are larger than average
changes.
7 Conclusions
What general conclusions can we draw from this analysis? First, the predictions
about markups and merger effects that can be obtained from simple models are often
very misleading. Unfortunately, however, a number of economists have attempted
to convince competition authorities that user–friendly canned programs can provide
reasonable predictions. Moreover, in addition to per–merger market shares, those
programs often require only one or two numbers as inputs.29 This can be true,
however, only if all elasticities are functionally related to one another in ways that
are preset by the program. Put another way, this means that answers are determined
by functional form and only back–of–the–envelope calculations are required.
Second, merger models that rely heavily on market shares and a choice of the
outside good are not very different from traditional analyses that involve market
definition and calculation of share–based indices of concentration. Moreover, in some
sense they are worse, since they are less transparent and they offer point predictions
of merger effects that give spurious impressions of accuracy.
The first two points can be illustrated using the simple logit demand model.
Suppose that 100 brands of a differentiated product are produced in an industry.
There are then 10,000 different own and cross–price elasticities. However, as we have
seen, all off–diagonal entries in a column of the logit elasticity matrix are identical.
Nevertheless, one might be tempted to conclude that that fact is unimportant, since
there are still 100 different cross–price elasticities, one for each brand. Whereas this
is true, it is not very interesting, since relative magnitudes are determined entirely by
market shares. Furthermore, absolute magnitudes can be manipulated by a strategic
choice of the outside good, with larger markets implying lower markups. Clearly, this
is also true of traditional merger analysis. However, most noneconomists who work in
29 To illustrate, the abstract of a recent working paper states that a particular simulation program
“can be implemented using market shares and two price elasticities.”
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the area understand the role that market definition plays. Unfortunately, they are less
apt to realize that the choice of the outside good plays a similar role. Nevertheless,
the logit model has been used extensively by competition authorities.30
Third, models that are capable of predicting with some accuracy are often difficult
to construct and estimate. Moreover, there are many modeling choices that must be
made that require experience and judgment. Unfortunately, when such models are
used, other economists can criticize those modeling choices on technical grounds that
serve to confuse lawyers, tribunal members, and jurors.31 When this occurs, the
econometric evidence is apt to be disregarded, since the ‘experts’ do not agree and
no one else can understand what they are saying.
Does this mean that we, as antitrust economists, are caught in a Prisoners’
Dilemma? Would we all be better off if simulation models did not exist? Not neces-
sarily. I think that there is a role for quantitative techniques to play, but we must be
careful not to oversell them.
An understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different merger models
can serve to organize our thoughts concerning mergers. In particular, we should
stop thinking about market definition and market shares and think about brand fit
instead.32 For example, a merger between two firms that produce lagers can have
very different consequences from one between a producer of lager and a producer
of stout, even though the HHI changes by the same amount after the two mergers.
Clearly, this is due to the fact that cross–price elasticities differ in the two cases.
One might therefore counter that it is merely necessary to define smaller submarkets
(e.g., lagers and stouts) and calculate shares of those submarkets. Whereas this is
partly true, it begs the question, since there can be other important dimensions along
which brands compete. Furthermore, since those dimensions can be continuous (e.g.,
alcohol content), the 0/1 classification under which brands are in the same or in
different markets is frequently not helpful.
There is a second way in which merger simulations can help us think sensibly about
merger effects in circumstances where mergers might be challenged. Specifically,
academic evidence on brand elasticities and merger effects is beginning to accumulate,
and much of that work was not undertaken in a consulting environment. Presumably,
the authors of many of those studies were interested in learning about the industry and
30 See, e.g., Werden and Froeb (2002).
31 See, e.g., Hausman and Leonard (2005).
32 This discussion applies to industries that produce differentiated products. The traditional
analysis is much better suited to handling mergers among fims that produce homogeneous products
(see Slade, 2004b).
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were not motivated by considerations of winning a case. Furthermore, since published
articles have been subjected to the refereeing process, their credibility is increased.
One should be able to draw on that literature to obtain a better understanding of
the forces that determine substitution patterns in particular industries. This will
usually mean drawing qualitative conclusions from quantitative evidence rather than
focusing on point estimates. Moreover, back–of–the–envelope calculations can be
based on such studies, and, as long as everyone understands the assumptions that
underlie those calculations and no spurious claims of accuracy are made, they can
be useful. However, we should eschew generic, one–size–fits–all merger models and
numbers that come out of black boxes.
In concluding, I should note that I have not mentioned merger–related efficiencies,
an issue that is potentially important.33 A complete merger–simulation model
requires a cost function that is capable of capturing economies of scale and scope.
Unfortunately, it is not obvious how one should embed long–run cost functions in
merger–simulation exercises, which are by assumption short run. Finally, there are
important merger–related dynamic issues, such entry, exit, and brand repositioning.
Those issues only make the problems that I have been discussing more complex.
33 My personal opinion on this subject is that, in the horizontal context, merger–related economies
are often exaggerated. In particular, in manufacturing, most economies of scale and scope occur at
the plant level. Moreover, although there are often substantial economies in distribution, distribu-
tional costs are often not a high fraction of total costs.
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Appendix A: The Role of the Outside Good
Consider the logit demand equation (1), which is equivalent to
ln(qi)− ln(M) = ln(q0)− ln(M) + βTxi − αpi + ξi. (7)
or
ln(qi) = ln(q0) + β
Txi − αpi + ξi. (8)
It is obvious from (8) that the choice of q0 affects only the estimate of the constant
term. In particular the estimate of α is unaffected.
On the other hand, own and cross–price elasticities, which are given by
εii = αpi(si − 1) and εij = αpjsj, j 6= i, (9)
are sensitive to the choice of q0. Specifically, since si falls when the market is defined
more broadly, the elasticities increase.
To understand the implications of this fact, consider the following example. There
are two ‘inside’ goods that are symmetric and one outside good to be chosen. We wish
to compare the situations in which one firm owns the two inside goods (monopoly)
to separate ownership (duopoly).
Under monopoly, it is straight forward to show that the price/cost margins or
Lerner indices will be set so that
LMi =
−1
ii + ij
. (10)
Under duopoly, in contrast, the cross–price effects will be ignored and each firm will
set a margin according to
LDi =
−1
ii
. (11)
Let the estimate of α be αˆ,34 the average price be p¯, and suppose that αˆp¯ =
20. Figure 2, which is based on those parameter values, contains graphs of predicted
34 Since there are only two brands of the differentiated product, for estimation purposes one must
use data from a number of markets.
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markups, LˆM and LˆD, as functions of the share of the outside good, s0. It shows that,
as one moves from larger to smaller markets, duopoly markups double. Monopoly
markups, in contrast, increase much more rapidly.
The figure also highlights several plausible choices of q0. The inside good is draft
beer. The smallest market is on–premise beer sales, which means that the outside
good is on–premise consumption of beer in bottles and cans. The next market candi-
date is beer sales, which includes off–premise sales, the third is alcoholic beverages,
which includes wine and spirits, the fourth is drinks, which includes soft drinks, juices,
and bottled water, and the broadest market is food and beverages.
One can imagine a case where the two parties present evidence obtained from the
same merger–simulation model. The defense, however, claims that the outside good
should be food and beverages and notes that markups are small (5%) and that they
will not change after the merger.35 The plaintiff, in contrast claims that the market
is on–premise beer sales, that markups are substantial, and that they will increase
five fold after the merger. Moreover, each party demonstrates that the simulation
program produces tight confidence intervals around his or her preferred estimates.
Appendix B: The Data
B1: Demand Data
Most of the demand data were collected by StatsMR, a subsidiary of A.C. Nielsen
Company. An observation is a brand of beer sold in a type of establishment, a region
of the country, and a time period. Brands are included in the sample if they accounted
for at least one half of one percent of one of the markets. There are 63 brands. Two
types of establishments are considered, multiples and independents, two regions of
the country, London and Anglia, and two bimonthly time periods, Aug/Sept and
Oct/Nov 1995. There are therefore potentially 504 observations. Not all variables
were available for all observations, however. When data for an observation were
incomplete, the corresponding observation was also dropped in the other region.36
35 The qualitative conclusions do not depend on the fact that merger to monopoly is considered.
Indeed, if there are three inside goods and the producers of two of them want to merge, the defense
would still claim that markups will not change after the merger, whereas the plaintiff would claim
that they will increase by 75%.
36 Observations were dropped in both regions because prices in one region are used as instruments
for prices in the other.
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This procedure reduced the sample to 444 observations.
Establishments are divided into two types. Multiples are public houses that either
belong to an organization (a brewer or a chain) that operates 50 or more public houses
or to estates with less than 50 houses that are operated by a brewer. Most of these
houses operated under exclusive–purchasing agreements (ties) that limited sales to
the brands of their affiliated brewer. Independents, in contrast, can be public houses,
clubs, or bars in hotels, theaters, cinemas, or restaurants.
For each observation, there is a price, sales volume, and coverage. Each is an
average for a particular brand, type of establishment, region, and time period. Price,
which is measured in pence per pint, is denoted PRICE. Volume, which is measured
in 100 barrels, is denoted VOL, and coverage, which is the percentage of outlets that
stocked the brand, is denoted COV.
VOL is the dependent variable in the distance–metric demand equation. With
the nested–logit specifications, in contrast, the dependent variable is LSHARE — the
natural logarithm of the brand’s overall market share — where the market includes
the outside good. The outside good here consists of all other alcoholic beverages.
Beer’s share of the alcoholic–beverage market averaged 55%.37
In addition, there are data that vary only by brand. These variables are product
type, brewer identity, and alcohol content.
Brands are classified into four product types, lagers, stouts, keg ales, and real ales.
Unfortunately, three brands — Tetley, Boddingtons, and John Smiths — have both
real and keg–delivered variants. Since it is not possible to obtain separate data on
the two variants, the classification that is used by StatsMR was adopted. Dummy
variables that distinguish the four product types are denoted PRODi, i = 1, . . . , 4.
The product types also form the basis of the groups for the NML specifications, and
those specifications include an explanatory variable LGSH, the natural logarithm of
the brand’s share of the group to which it belongs.
There are ten brewers in the sample, the four nationals, Bass, Carlsberg–Tetley,
Scottish Courage, and Whitbread, two brewers without tied estate,38 Guiness and
Anheuser Busch, and four regional brewers, Charles Wells, Greene King, Ruddles,
and Youngs. Brewers are distinguished by dummy variables, BREWi, i = 1, . . . , 10.
Each brand has an alcohol content that is measured in percentage. This continuous
variable is denoted ALC. Moreover, brands whose alcohol contents are greater than
37 When the NML is estimated, the log of the share of the outside good is moved to the right–hand
side of the equation, where it is captured by market fixed effects.
38 Brewers without tied estate are not vertically integrated into retailing.
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4.2% are called premium, whereas those with lower alcohol contents are called regular
beers. A dichotomous alcohol–content variable, PREM, that equals one for premium
brands and zero otherwise, was therefore created.
Dummy variables that distinguish establishment types, MULT = 1 for multiples,
regions of the country, LONDON = 1 for London, national brewers, NAT = 1 for
nationals, and time periods, PER1 = 1 for the first period, were also created.
Finally, a variable, NCB, was created as follows. First, each brand was assigned
a spatial market, where brand i’s market consists of the set of consumers whose
most preferred brand is closer to i in taste space than to any other brand. Euclidean
distance in alcohol/coverage space was used in this calculation. Specifically, i’s market
consists of all points in alcohol/coverage space that are closer to i’s location in that
space than to any other brand’s location. NCBi is then the number of brands that
share a market boundary (in the above sense) with i, where boundaries consist of
indifferent consumers (i.e., loci of points that are equidistant from the two brands).39
A number of interaction variables are also used. Interactions with price are de-
noted PRVVV, where VVV is a characteristic. To illustrate, PRALCi denotes price
times alcohol content, PRICEi × ALCi.
B2: Cost Data
Brewing and wholesaling costs include material, delivery, excise, and advertising
expenses per unit sold. Retailing costs include labor and wastage. Finally, combined
costs include VAT. Two changes to the MMC figures were made. First, their figures
include overhead, which is excluded here because it is a fixed cost. Second their
figures do not include advertising and marketing costs. Nevertheless, several of the
companies report advertising expenditures per unit sold, and the numbers in the table
are averages of those figures.
Costs were updated to transform them into 1995 pence per pint. To do this, the
closest available price index for each category of expense was collected and expendi-
tures in each category were multiplied by the ratio of the appropriate price index in
1995 to the corresponding index in 1985.
If average variable costs (AVC) in brewing are constant, these numbers are marginal
costs, but if AVC vary with output, they either over or underestimate marginal costs.
However, it is difficult to predict the direction of the bias. Indeed, due to the presence
of fixed costs, AVC can increase with output even when there are increasing returns.
39 The details of this construction can be found in Pinkse and Slade (2002).
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Table 1: Selected International Comparisons
Consumption/Head (Liters) Country 1975 1985 1995 2003
UK 118.5 109.2 100.9 101.3
US 81.8 89.7 83.5 81.6
Canada 87.0 82.2 66.5 68.4
France 41.3 40.1 39.1 35.5
Germany 147.8 145.4 137.7 117.7
Imports (%) Country 1975 1985 1995 2003
UK 4.4 6.0 8.8 10.7
US 1.1 4.3 6.0 11.6
Canada 0.6 4.4 3.3 9.7
France 8.6 11.1 15.4 24.0
Germany 0.8 1.2 2.3 2.8
Draft Sales (%) Country 1991 1996 2003
UK 71 66 57
US 11 10 9
Canada 10 12 10
France 25 23 23
Germany 23 20 20
Source: The Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association and the British Beer and Pub Association
Table 2: Three–Firm Concentration Ratios in 1985
UK US Canada France West Germany
(CR5)
47 74 96 81 28
Source: The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC 1989)
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Table 3: Selected UK Beer Statistics
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000
% Lager 7 31 51 63
Real Ale/Total Ale (%) NA 30 37 30
% On Premise Sales 90 88 80 67
Number of Brewers 96 81 65 57
Source: The Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association and the British Beer and Pub Association
Table 4: National Brewer Market Shares, Draft and Packaged
Brewer 1985 1991 1996
Allied Lyons 13 12
14
Carlsberg NA 4
Bass 22 22 23
Courage 9
19
Grand Metropolitan 11
28
Scottish & Newcastle 10 11
Whitbread 11 12 13
Total 77 78 78
Source: The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC 1989)
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Table 5: IV Demand Equations
Functional Form
−α σ σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
Logita -0.0007
(-0.1)
Nested Logita -0.0026 0.830
(-1.0) (12.3)
Extended NLa -0.0050 0.762 0.668 0.944 0.739
(-1.7) (12.4) (9.6) (12.9) (9.3)
PRICE PRCOVR PRPREM PRNCB RPPROD RPALC
Distance Metricb -1.125 0.165 -0.030 -0.117 0.712 0.215
(-2.9) (7.8) (-0.1) (-2.7) (2.6) (1.6)
a) Contains ALC, LCOV, product, time–period, and regional fixed effects. α is the
coefficient of price, and σ measures within–group correlation of utilities.
b) Contains ALC, LCOV, time–period, establishment type, and regional fixed effects. A prefix of PR
implies that price is interacted with that variable. A prefix of RP means that that distance measure
is used to create an average rival price. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and spatial
correlation of an unknown form.
Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.
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Table 6: Estimated Elasticities: Brand Averages
Functional Form Own–Price Elasticity Cross–Price Elasticity
Logit -0.97 0.0005
Nested Logit -2.4 0.0344
Extended NL -3.4 0.0517
Distance Metric -4.6 0.0632
AIDS -5.0 0.121
Hausman, Leonard,
and Zona (1995)
Table 7: Summary of Cost Estimates
Method Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum
Exogenous, cˇ 129.1 5.2 124.0 147.0
Implicit, c˜a
Nested Logit 79.0 14.6 51.6 132.3
Extended NL 98.6 23.0 46.1 158.4
Distance Metric 128.0 35.7 35.1 205.5
Estimated, cˆa,b 133.5 40.6 30.9 211.7
a) Static Nash equilibrium in price.
b) Using the Distance Metric demand equation.
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Table 8: Sensitivity of Implicit Costs to Equilibrium Assumptions
Assumption Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum
MC Pricing 167.8 20.2 117.0 204.5
Bertrand 128.0 35.7 35.1 205.5
Joint–Profit Max 99.1 41.3 15.1 201.7
Using the Distance Metric demand equation.
Table 9: Two–Step GMM Estimates of Marginal–Cost Functions
EQN VOL PREM ALC PUBM PROD1 PROD2 PROD3 CONST J statistic
d.f.= 8
1 0.0008 0.221 0.256 0.429 0.190 -0.011 4.519 12.1
(2.5) (3.4) (3.2) (5.1) (4.4) (-0.2) (51.6
2 0.0012 0.178 0.257 0.359 0.239 -0.012 3.877 12.3
(2.3) (3.1) (3.0) (4.9) (4.2) (-0.2) (2.9)
Using the Distance Metric demand equation.
Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.
Corrected for heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation of an unknown form.
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Table 10: Predicted Equilibrium Prices and Margins
Demand Model Mean Price Standard Dev. Mean Margin
Nested Logit 244.7 44.2 89.5
Extended NL 211.0 38.1 45.1
Distance Metric 168.4 29.5 30.4
Observed Prices 167.8 20.2 29.9
From a static pricing game using the exogenous cost estimates, cˇ.
6
Table 11: Merger Simulations
Market Structure Demand Model Predicted Price % Change from
Average Status Quo
Status Quo
(Actual structure)
Nested Logit 244.7 0
Extended NL 211.0 0
Distance Metric 168.4 0
Scottish/Courage
(Divestiture)
Nested Logit
Extended NL
Distance Metric 167.4 -0.6
Bass/Carlsberg–Tetley
(Merger)
Nested Logit 413.0 69
Extended NL 302.1 43
Distance Metric 173.5 3
Static pricing game using the exogenous cost estimates, cˇ.
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